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Background: Lebanon, a small Middle Eastern country facing constant political and national 
unity challenges with a population of approximately 300,000 Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, 
has welcomed more than 1.2 million Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR)-registered Syrian refugees since 2012. The Government of Lebanon considers 
individuals who crossed Lebanese–Syrian borders since 2011 as “displaced”, emphasizing its 
long-standing position that Lebanon is not a state for refugees, refusing to establish camps, and 
adopting a policy paper to reduce their numbers in October 2014. Humanitarian response to the 
Syrian influx to Lebanon has been constantly assembling with the UNHCR as the main acting 
body and the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan as the latest plan for 2016. 
Methods: Review of secondary data from gray literature and reports focusing on the influx of 
Syrian refugees to Lebanon by visiting databases covering humanitarian response in complex 
emergencies. Limitations include obtaining majority of the data from gray literature and chang-
ing statistics due to the instability of the situation. 
Results: The influx of Syrian refugees to Lebanon, an already weak and vulnerable state, has 
negatively impacted life in Lebanon on different levels including increasing demographics, 
regressing economy, exhausting social services, complicating politics, and decreasing security 
as well as worsened the life of displaced Syrians themselves. 
Conclusion: Displaced Syrians and Lebanese people share aggravating hardships of a mutual 
and precarious crisis resulting from the Syrian influx to Lebanon. Although a lot of response 
has been initiated, both populations still lack much of their basic needs due to lack of funding 
and nonsustainable program initiatives. The two major recommendations for future interven-
tions are to ensure continuous and effective monitoring and sustainability in order to alleviate 
current and future suffering in Lebanon. 
Keywords: Syria, refugees, Lebanon, impact, risk factors, vulnerability 
Introduction
Lebanon, a small country with a surface area of 10,452 km2 and a mountainous nature, is 
located on the east of the Mediterranean Sea in western Asia and bounded by Syria in the 
north and the east and Palestine in the south. Since it is located in a water-deficient region, 
Lebanon’s most valuable natural resource is water; yet, it is substantially lost due to subopti-
mal management. Lebanon was founded in September 1920 and the Lebanese constitution 
was written in 1926 declaring it as a free economy, parliamentary democracy, and secular 
Arab state. Amended after the independence in 1943 and revisited in 1990 through the 
Ta’if Accord, the constitution acknowledges the rights of each religious community, but 
demands the eventual elimination of political confessionalism,  officially recognizing over 
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18 religious sects.1, 2 Approximately, 4.467 million is the total 
estimated population,3 but no precise numbers on the popula-
tion distribution per sect are present, since the only population 
census that was performed was when Lebanon was still under 
the French mandate in 1932. More than 220,000 Palestinians 
live in refugee camps and ~40,000 Iraqi refugees as well as an 
additional 100,000 workers including domestic workers and 
semi-skilled workers, majorly from Egypt, African, and South 
East Asian countries, reside in the country.2 While Lebanon’s 
demographic and confessional diversity is considered a national 
resource, it also represents significant challenges to political and 
national unity during a period of regional unrest. The hardness 
in establishing a new government and reconciling on a new 
electoral law exhibit the magnitude of political polarization.1 
This paper examines the relationship between the vulner-
able factors already prevalent in Lebanon and their role in 
further aggravating the Syrian refugee influx for both the 
Lebanese and displaced Syrians. 
Methods
Secondary data sources focusing on the influx of Syrian refugees 
to Lebanon and the response initiated were reviewed. Visited 
databases included Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, PreventionWeb, ReliefWeb, United Nations Develop-
ment Project, Office of the United Nations Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Health Organization 
(WHO). The data, statistics, and plans about Syrian refugees 
in Lebanon were obtained from international sources dealing 
with humanitarian response in complex emergencies, mainly 
ReliefWeb and UNHCR using the names of countries (Lebanon, 
Syria) as the research criteria and  narrowing the search for 
reports and relevant data about this crisis. This paper includes 
vulnerabilities and negative impacts of the Syrian refugee influx 
in Lebanon summarized from the various reports and articles 
obtained. All the data were first collected in a folder. Then, they 
were processed and reviewed to present the relevant information 
in written format with related figures.
Results
Lebanon and Syrian refugees
With respect to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, Lebanon is neither a State Party 
nor it has signed its protocol;4,5 however, voluntarily execut-
ing some of its articles and considering granting the status of 
refugee to individuals is within its boundary of free choice. The 
Lebanese Government emphasizes on all instances its long-
established stance confirming that Lebanon is not an ultimate 
destination for refugees, an asylum country, or a resettlement 
country deeming individuals who have fled from Syrian borders 
to Lebanese borders beyond March 2011 as “displaced”.5
Lebanon welcomed more than 1.2 million Syrian refugees 
registered with UNHCR from 2012 till the end of 2015 (Figure 
1),5,6 and many more are present but without registration.7 As 
the Lebanese Government has not permitted the establishment 
of formal camps, displaced Syrians remain dispersed all over 
the country in over 1,700 localities8 all over the six districts, 
where Bekaa (Arsal) and North (Akkar), which include the most 
vulnerable, poor, and undeserved communities,9 host the largest 
numbers (373,124) followed by Beirut (314,731).10 In spite of 
its contemporary history of military and political conflicts as 
well as pressures on its infrastructure, Lebanon kept its borders 
open till October 2014,7,11,12 after which it adopted a policy 
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Figure 1 UNHCR registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon since January 2012.
Abbreviation: UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
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The lebanese–syrian crisis
paper to limit and decrease the Syrian refugee population on 
the Lebanese land, secure Lebanese and Syrian people’s safety, 
and ease the burden placed on Lebanese people and economy.13 
Moreover, Lebanon is now considered the highest per capita 
embracer of refugees in the world,7,12 and it is anticipated that 
the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon will reach 1.5 million 
by the end of 2015.7 Figure 1 shows the evolution of the total 
number of refugees from 2012 to the present.14
Response to Syrian influx in Lebanon
Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, momentum to 
respond to the collective social, humanitarian, economic, 
and environmental shocks in Lebanon has been regularly 
assembling. In 2014, on the humanitarian part, the Regional 
Response Plan and two-sided humanitarian programs in col-
laboration with the Government, national and international 
nongovernmental organizations, and the United Nations (UN) 
provided more than US$770 million to ease stress on Lebanese 
poor, Lebanese returnees, displaced Syrians, and Palestine 
refugees from Syria and Lebanon. In addition, the international 
community has also devoted considerable financial resources 
to infrastructure and initiatives for policy reforms tailored to 
address the development hurdles existing before the crisis.5 
Moreover, UNHCR is one of the main bodies acting for this 
purpose in Lebanon, and a sector analysis of its administered 
humanitarian assistance is summarized in Figure 2.8 
Shelter
• Rehabilitating houses and providing collective shelters
• Increasing shelter options
• Providing cash assistance for rent
• Trucking of water in rural areas
• Providing access to public water networks
• Conducting awareness campaigns encouraging water
   preservation practices
• Advocating for a sustainable water payment system
• Distributing food vouchers through the World Food Program
• Increasing assistance per person from US$27 to US$31
   during winter to promote caloric intake
• Providing conditional and unconditional cash transfers,
   moving to ATM cards and e-vouchers 
• Promoting targeting to decrease negative coping
   mechanisms
• Fundemental needs of susceptible refugees are
   predominantely being met despite confronted budget
   constraints
• Providing a winterization package
• Covering 75% of the fees charged
• Providing, initially, health services at entry points
• Contracting, now, GlobeMed, a profit organization, to
   direct insurance schemes and referral systems 
• Granting Syrian refugee children the right to enroll in
   public schools by supporting the ministry for education
   and higher education
• Paying tuition fees
• Rehabilitating schools
• Implementing community-based education programs
WASH
Food
Cash
Core relief items
Health
Education
Figure 2 Sector analysis of humanitarian assistance by administered UNHCR.
Abbreviations: ATM, automated teller machine; UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; WASH, water, hygiene, and sanitation.
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The 2015–2016 Lebanon crisis 
response
The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016, 
referred to as the 3RP, includes the Lebanon Crisis Response 
Plan (LCRP) as the response to the Syrian influx in Lebanon. 
The LCRP is managed by UNCHR and the United Nations 
Development Project. Initiated by the Lebanese Government 
and the UN in 2015, the LCRP merges a focused humanitar-
ian response with a larger plan in order to boost stabilization 
in Lebanon, benefiting from lessons learned by the various 
national and international partners. It attempts to raise US$2.14 
billion to supply protection and humanitarian assistance to 2.2 
million de facto Syrian refugees who are highly vulnerable 
and have acute needs, and invest in institutions, services, and 
economies to reach 2.9 million vulnerable people.5
The LCRP has three strategic priorities or response 
areas which address the capacities of affected communities, 
national government, and Lebanese institutions to improve 
quality of public services to poor Lebanese and de facto 
Syrian refugees and help them cope with worst effects due 
to poverty and displacement while decreasing tensions in 
highly stressed communities. The three response strate-
gies work on nine sectors including basic assistance; food 
security; shelter; education; water, hygiene, and sanitation 
(WASH); livelihoods; health; social stability; and protection.5 
A summary of these sectors is presented in Table 1. Except 
for WASH, the majority of the sectors are massively under-
funded,5 forcing the UN to decrease its coverage for shelter, 
health, and nutrition.15 
effect of emergency on lebanon
In 2011, when Lebanon initially opened its frontiers to 
 Syrian families fleeing the conflict, communities of Lebanon 
complied with no hesitation. They supplied shelter, generous 
welcome, services, and support despite the fact that their own 
needs, in numerous instances, were already elevated. Today, 
after 4 years, with no anticipated termination of vehemence 
in Syria, the Government and Lebanese communities have 
arrived at a critical point and a stringent stability test on the 
social and economic impact of the Syrian crisis in Lebanon 
attained new peaks.5
Demographic impact
By April 2014, the millionth Syrian refugee was registered 
with UNHCR in Lebanon. In November, Lebanon had wel-
comed more than 1.5 million people escaping the conflict in 
Syria with 440,000 new comers in 2014 alone. Aside from 
the Government’s estimate of hundreds of thousands of 
unregistered individuals,5 after December 2014 in Lebanon, 
more than one in each four people is a de facto Syrian refugee 
or a Palestinian refugee.4,5 The number of people living in 
Lebanon – currently having 1,421 informal settlements – has 
sharply soared by a minimum of 30% since March 2011 – 
possibly by nearly 1.5 million as reported by Government 
estimates – in a state of only four million Lebanese. In addi-
tion, urban densification is anticipated to rise by one-third 
with a population density increasing from 400 to 520 persons 
per square kilometer.5
Economic impact
The Syrian refugee influx in Lebanon has aggravated politi-
cal, economic, and security challenges, impairing major 
drivers of economy, such as trade, banking, and tourism,1 and 
decreasing job opportunities as well as increasing the chal-
lenges of attaining the key Millennium Development Goals. 
Growth of the economy has tumbled with debt augmenting 
Table 1 sector plans of the lcRP
Sector People in 
need
People 
targeted
Requirements 
(million US$)
Number of 
partners
Funding already received, 
2015 (million US$)
Estimated needs 
2016 (million US$)
Food security 1,520,000 1,236,976 447 13 5.9 343.7
Basic assistance 1,341,240 889,500 288.6 29 1.5 263
Education 750,000 377,000 263.6 28 100 255
Health 3,322,000 2,040,000 249.2 24 20.3 198.6
WASH 3,365,000 2,862,291 231.4 33 204.3 190
livelihoods 700,000 242,536 175.9 27 17.7 175
social stability 242a 242b 157.3 27 18 160
shelter 1,806,200 1,368,255 147.2 23 5 150
Protection 3,365,000 2,185,000 183 33 16.3 171.3
Notes: aRefers to communities in need instead of people in need; bRefers to communities targeted instead of people targeted. The LCRP aims to boosts communities’ and 
institutions’ abilities to prevent conflict, alleviate tensions, and report the comprehensive response on the progress of tension. Adapted from Lebanon crisis response plan 
2015–2016.5
Abbreviations: LCRP, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan; WASH, water, hygiene, and sanitation.
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to 141% of growth domestic product (GDP) in 20135 and 
GDP growth decreasing from 10% in 2010 to 1% in 2014,7 
and it is expected to increase just by 2% in 2015.5 Now, one 
in five Lebanese are unemployed5 with unemployment dou-
bling to 34%5,7 and peaking at record rates as the labor force 
has increased by 50% since 2011, and one-third of young 
Lebanese laborers are unable to find work competing in a par-
ticularly intensified informal sector that contributes to more 
than 56% of total employment. It has become more difficult 
to even acquire jobs with low salaries, dramatically impacting 
labor market standards.5 These factors have exhausted public 
spending and have tested Lebanon’s economic, social, and 
political resilience.7 Furthermore, since 2011, Government 
and World Bank estimates reveal that the number of poor 
people presently living in Lebanon has increased by 170,000 
– approximately a two-third fold reaching 2.1 million; of 
which, 336,000 are living with less than US$2.4 per day, 
which is under Lebanon’s lowest poverty line.5 Moreover, the 
rising demand and restricted supply of accommodation are 
contributing to soaring rental prices affecting poor Lebanese 
who are unable to cope with this rise,8 whereby a 44% increase 
in rents was reported between June 2012 and June 2013.16
Social services impact
After 4 years of restricted access to fundamental services 
and economic anguish, youth and children are the ones 
mostly affected, being ~50% of the affected population, as a 
minimum of 1.2 million are presently growing up deprived, 
susceptible, and with severe needs for protection and basic 
services. Public services are exhausted, including infrastruc-
ture, national health,5,11 and education, and are left unable 
to handle the additional magnitudes. The impact has mostly 
been evident in the health care system,12,17 witnessing a 27% 
increase in tuberculosis rates since 2011,15,17 currently strug-
gling and lacking staff, equipment,12 and medication.9,12 Con-
sequently, Lebanese have had decreased access to primary 
health care because of perceived reduced quality of care, 
overcrowding, and increased waiting time.9 On the other hand, 
most Lebanese children are enrolled in private schools, while 
only 300,000 or 27% attend public ones. Research published 
in 2014 by the Ministry of Environment traced the range of 
damage to the already fragile environment in Lebanon. It 
indicated that municipal spending on waste disposal, particu-
larly in Akkar and Bekaa, has increased by 40%, and 92% 
of sewage is running untreated into water sources due to the 
increased demand for land, water resources, electricity, and 
waste disposal, exceeding the capacity to meet it. As a result, 
since 2011, waste water pollution has increased by 33%.5
Political and security impact
Lebanon is solicitous to conserve its ephemeral stability 
with rapidly aggravating social tensions and poverty in 
regions of Lebanon where huge numbers of registered Syrian 
refugees coexist with a history of fragile delivery of service 
for the local population.5 In a 2013 national poll addressing 
Lebanese perceptions toward the Syrian crisis, 52% of the 
interviewees believed that displaced Syrians are threatening 
national stability and security, a solid 98% presumed  Syrian 
refugees are taking jobs from the local population, and ~50% 
thought that the refugees are benefiting from financial aid in 
an unfair manner.18 Amounting security concerns are affect-
ing all susceptible people. In 2014, the prospect perils of 
having a relapsing condition were confirmed when radical 
armed groups associated with the claimed-to-be “Islamic 
State” and Al-Nusra Front arrived to Lebanon to displace its 
communities, assault Lebanese Armed Forces, and heighten 
worries around national stability. A series of security acci-
dents led to the engagement of the Lebanese Armed Forces 
with these groups.5
Of the countries affected by the influx, Lebanon has been 
the mostly affected in terms of political and security environ-
ment as the country has been divided into two groups: those 
who support the opposition in Syria and those who support 
Assad.16 As a result, a series of 29 suicide bombings and 
assassinations occurred between October 2012 and Novem-
ber 2015 leading to the death of 205 individuals and injuring 
1,796 others; the vast majority of victims were civilians.19 
A summary of these events is presented in Table 2. 
Impact on displaced Syrians in 
Lebanon
De facto refugees are confronting a prolonged test of endur-
ance and bravery as they deplete their savings during a 4-year 
period of restricted access to services, economic hardship, 
and heightening vulnerability. At the end of 2014, 90% of 
Syrians fled the border requiring help to register, find food 
and shelter, and attain basic material needs. At least 78% 
of those registered were women and children. An estimated 
30% do not have documentation for legal stay, and 29% 
cannot meet their survival needs with no access to commu-
nity support networks – their number is expected to reach 
435,000 by the end of 2015. On the other hand, 55% of the 
registered  Syrians have more than US$400 as debt with 82% 
paying rent5 averaging US$200 per month for a low standard 
room.8 The International Labor Organizations estimates that 
while 50% of young Syrians do not have activities to gener-
ate income, the percentage increases to 66% among young 
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women. As the majority of Syrians are low- to semiskilled 
laborers and 92% of them are working without contracts, 
the work available to the most vulnerable of them is heavily 
underpaid, intermittent, and outside of Lebanese labor pro-
tection mechanisms, aggravating their poor condition and 
inability to meet their fundamental household expenses.5 
Moreover, a recent assessment showed that 30% of Syrian 
households lack sufficient water for domestic use, 15% are 
deficient in hygiene items, and 40% cannot access appropri-
ate latrines.8
The number of displaced Syrian children in Lebanon who 
are not receiving education is nearly two-thirds and is equal 
to 300,000 in spite of great attempts to register 90,000 in 
the year 2013–2014, and only one-third of them leave their 
homes once every week contributing to sadness and feelings 
of isolation. Also, one in ten displaced Syrian children are 
forced to work to complement family income and others 
are subjected to child marriage, drugs and  alcohol abuse, 
violent groups,5 and begging.8 Furthermore, the 2013–2014 
report of the Lebanon Millennium Development Goals 
showed that many of the interviewed Syrian displaced fami-
lies report living on one cooked meal per day – including 
45% of Palestine refugees from Syria– and only 20% have 
three. Just 6% of the displaced children from Syria aged 
6–23 months eat the minimum sufficient diet based on the 
United Nations  Children’s Fund (UNICEF)/WHO standards.5 
Marriages within the family has led to an increase in the rates 
of abortions and child malformations.17 Refugees’ health is 
worsening15 with ~11% of the displaced Syrians exhibiting 
psychiatric symptoms,20 specifically psychological scars of 
mischievous experiences of sexual and sex-based violence as 
well as physical assaults – frequently within the family – and 
emotional violence. While cases are broadly underreported, 
25% of the reported incidents using protection mechanisms 
show that 87% of the identified and assisted were women 
and girls while 13% were men and boys.5 In addition, 2013 
Table 2 Summary of attacks in Lebanon post-Syrian conflict
Date Area Target Method Death Injured
Oct 19, 2012 Achrafieh, West Beirut Wissam Al Hassan, head of the intelligence 
branch of the isF
Massive car bomb 8 128
July 9, 2013 Beir el-Abed, South Beirut Popular street associated with Hezbollah car bomb 0 50
Aug 15, 2013 Roueiss, South Beirut Hezbollah stronghold car bomb 27 300
Aug 23, 2013 Tripoli Two mosques Two car bombs 42 400
nov 19, 2013 Suburb, South Beirut Iranian Cultural Center Car bomb and explosive 
motorcycle 
22 146
Dec 3, 2013 Beirut Hassan lakkis, senior Hezbollah 
commander
assassination by two 
gunmen
1 0
Dec 27, 2013 Downtown, Beirut Former Minister Mohamad chatah car bomb 6 70
Jan 2, 2014 Haret Hreik, South Beirut Hezbollah Political Office car bomb 4 77
Jan 16, 2014 Hermel Bustling neighborhood car bomb 5 42
Jan 21, 2014 Haret Hreik, South Beirut Bustling street Suicide bomber 4 46
Feb 1, 2014 Hermel Petrol station car bomb 4 23
Feb 3, 2014 South Beirut Van Suicide bomber 0 2
Feb 19, 2014 Suburb, South Beirut Iranian Cultural Center Two car bombs 8 128
Feb 22, 2014 Hermel army Post car bomb 5 17
March 29, 2014 arsal army soldiers car bomb 3 4
June 20, 2014 Dahr al Baidar Police checkpoint Suicide bomber 1 32
June 24, 2014 Beirut Military checkpoint car bomb 0 12
June 27, 2014 Beirut Hotel Suicide bomber 0 11
Aug 6, 2014 Tripoli army checkpoint Homemade bomb 1 10
sept 19, 2014 arsal army Bomb 2 3
sept 20, 2014 eastern Borders of lebanon Hezbollah checkpoint Bomb 2 0
nov 14, 2014 arsal army Bomb 0 3
Dec 3, 2014 arsal army Bomb 1 2
Jan 10, 2015 Tripoli café Suicide bomber 9 30
Jan 26, 2015 Zagharta Ghassan Ajaj, ISF intelligence officer Gunman 1 0
March 2, 2015 north lebanon Bader eid, brother of alawite leader ali eid Gunman 1 0
nov 5, 2015 arsal Qalamoun Muslim Scholars Committee Motorcycle bomb 5 15
nov 6, 2015 arsal army Improvised explosive device 0 5
nov 12, 2015 Bourj el-Barajmeh, South Beirut Hezbollah stronghold Two suicide bombers 43 240
205 1796
Note: Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.19
Abbreviation : ISF, Internal Security Forces. 
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 information fathered by the Amel Association revealed that 
of the Syrian patients assessed, 47% suffered from skin 
diseases (lice, staphylococcal skin infection, leishmaniasis), 
27% had diseases of the digestive system, and 19% suffered 
from respiratory diseases.21
Discussion
Since the beginning of the refugee influx to Lebanon, a highly 
indebted middle-income country with a history of political 
strife, presence of other vulnerable displaced populations, 
and weak government capacities,2 as well as standing political 
deadlock,22 the conflict dissolved into a mutual and precarious 
crisis for both displaced Syrians and the Lebanese as they 
shared the scrambled soup of aggravating hardships of the 
mass influx to a previously stressed state. 
Both populations are struggling from economic and security 
impacts, be it poor living conditions or life-threatening events, 
increasing the tension between formerly harmonious neighbors. 
Lebanon has neither been able to mitigate nor respond to this 
high-impact and vigorous disaster, acting as a weak host state to 
displaced Syrians and with incapable body of governors for its 
citizens. With the 3RP and its Lebanese chapter (the LCRP) rep-
resenting a comprehensive theoretical strategy for the diverse 
response sectors, their successful application and efficacy 
remain questionable taking into account the highly elevated 
needs compared with the persistent underfunding as well as the 
absence of sustainability in the various projects implemented in 
Lebanon at the local, national, or international level. 
It is crucial to acknowledge that this paper includes 
limitations as a result of the unstable structure of the Syrian 
refugee crisis in Lebanon. First, the majority of evidence 
about this emergency comes from gray literature and reports 
from national and international organizations, and not from 
journal articles with peer reviews. Second, the evidence used 
was based on a scoping review of the literature rather than a 
comprehensive one. Third, statistics presented about refugees 
may only be accurate for a short duration of time, as their 
condition is largely unstable and their numbers in Lebanon 
are continuously increasing.
Conclusion
Based on the information compiled from different resources 
regarding funding deficiency for this and other crises 
and the inferior economic situation, there are two major 
 recommendations to alleviate the current and future human 
suffering in Lebanon. First, continuous and effective 
monitoring and follow-up of local, national, and regional 
 development, and economic projects should be ensured to 
build back better. Most of the projects initiated in Lebanon 
have a strong onset but tend to be neglected and forgotten 
as time passes. While trying to gather information for this 
report, websites of such projects were found outdated and 
the projects themselves had not been fully implemented. 
Hence, it is crucial for national or international donors to 
perform continuous evaluation and application of their funded 
programs; otherwise, the funds are wasted attempts with no 
significant progress. Second, the provision of good-quality and 
accountable humanitarian aid should be carried out ensuring 
its sustainability. One of the key problems of the aid given to 
Syrian refugees and poor Lebanese in Lebanon is its frequent 
abruption due to lack of funding. When financial resources are 
available, they are used to directly provide immediate needs 
to the affected populations, contributing to their dependency 
and not using their inherent capacities. When they are lacking, 
however, those vulnerable individuals are left alone to face 
hardships and agony. Therefore, future assistance should be 
administered taking into account the “do no harm” principle, 
by which more efficient use of monetary resources could be 
executed. Finally, publishing of research articles examining 
the resilience and coping strategies undertaken in Lebanon as 
well as the humanitarian response setbacks is crucial in order 
to respond better in future crisis in Lebanon and worldwide. 
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